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BRIEF STATEMENT RE APPELLATE JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final judgement of the Honorable K.
Roger Bean, of the Second Circuit Court in and for Davis County,
State of Utah denying Defendant-Appellate's motion to suppress
the blood alcohol test and the subsequent verdict-of guilty
rendered in a jury trial on July 9, 1992.

The court of Appeals

has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-3 of
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended)

STATEMENT OP ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS APPEAL
Whether or not a blood alcohol test is admissible in a trial
for driving under the influence of alcohol when the withdrawal of
the blood does not comply with Section 41-6-44.10(5a) of Utah
Code Ann. (1953, as amended)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 28, 1992 Deputy Neal Wagner of the Davis County
Sheriff's Office was called to Hill Air Force base hospital
(R.12).

Deputy Wagner was called to the hospital to withdraw

blood samples from William A. Atwood (R.12)

Deputy Wagner was

told that Mr. Atwood was involved in a injury accident in Layton
City (R.12) and that Officer Hein had received written consent
from Mr. Atwood to withdraw the blood (R.13).
conferred a Mr. Woodall (R.13).

Deputy Wagner then

Mr. Woodall was in the Air Force

working as a lab technician (R.19).

Mr. Woodall and Deputy

Wagner agreed that Mr. Woodall would draw his blood first (R.20).
1

Mr. Woodall on his own, without advice from the Deputy, using
some hospital equipment and some equipment supplied by Deputy
Wagner, (R.21,22) inserted the needle in the vein of Mr. Atwood
(R.21) and withdrew two or three samples of blood (R.22).

Using

some of the medical equipment supplied by Mr. Woodall and some of
his own medical equipment (R.23) Deputy Wagner proceed to
withdraw blood for Layton City (R.24). Mr. Woodall assisted
Deputy Wagner in withdrawing the blood for Layton City (R.24).
Later, at a hearing filed by the Defendant to suppress the
results of the blood test, Ms. Eller, the attorney for Layton
City stipulated that Mr. Woodall probably doesn't hold a permit
to withdraw blood under Utah Law (R.30).

In any case,

Layton

City never did present evidence that Mr. Woodall, the Hill Air
Force Base medical technician was certified under Utah law to
withdraw blood and the Judge made his decision on the basis that
Deputy Wagner and not Mr. Woodall was certified under Utah law to
draw blood.

After the drawing of blood, William A. Atwood was

arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol.

On June 4,

1992, the Defendant Appellant's attorney filed a motion to
suppress the blood test.

The motion was based on the fact that

Mr. Woodall, who was the primary mover in taking blood from Mr.
Atwood was not certified under Utah law. A hearing was held on
June 30, 1992 (R.3).

On July 9, 1992, the Judge denied Defendant

appellantfs motion to suppress.

The evidence of the blood test

was admitted to the jury and they found the Defendant guilty of
driving under the influence of alcohol.

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The lower court erred when it denied the Defendant appellant
motion to suppress the blood test results.

The blood sample was

not drawn by a lab technician certified under Utah law.

Utah

law requires all evidence of a blood test to be drawn by a
technician certified pursuant to Utah law.

The city failed to

show that the blood was drawn by a technician certified by the
state of Utah, therefore the results of the blood test should not
have been admitted in trial.
ARGUMENT
Utah law specifically states who can withdraw blood to
determine the alcohol content of the blood and later allow the
results to be offered at trial.

There is a statute in Utah which

specifically outlines what persons are permitted to withdraw
blood.

Section 41-6-44.10(5a) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended)

states as follows:
Only a physician, registered nurse,
practical nurse or person authorized
under Section 26-1-30(19) acting
at the request of a peace officer, may
withdraw blood to determine the alcohol
or drug content. This limitation does
not apply to taking a urine or breath
specimen, (emphasis added)
Thus, it is very clear that Utah law requires that a person
must be authorized under Utah law to withdraw blood to determine
the alcohol or drug content.

The above referral to the section
3

of Utah law goes on to state how a person can be authorized to
withdraw blood.

The Section specifically refers to Section 26-1-

30(2r) of Utah Code Annotated.

That section tells us how and

what must be done to be certified to withdraw blood to determine
the alcohol or drug content.

Section 2 6-1-3 0 of Utah Code Ann

(1953 as amended) states as follows:
(1) The department shall: ...
(2) ...
(r) Establish qualifications for individuals
permitted to draw blood pursuant to Section
41-6-44.10, and to issue permits to
individuals that it finds qualified, which
permits may be temrinated or revoked by the
department;....
Not only must you meet the qualifications required by Utah
Law to draw blood to determine the alcohol and drug content, you
must also get a permit to show that you have in fact met the
qualifications to withdraw blood to determine the alcohol or drug
content.

The permit may also may be terminated or revoked if the

department feels it appropriate.

Further, the department has to

establish qualifications for individuals permitted to draw blood.
The reason for this section of law is obvious.

You are intruding

on a person's body when you withdraw blood from them and the
state must maintain control over all persons such an intrusion.
To allow others under color of law to intervene in any way or
interfere with the withdrawal of the blood could jeopardize the
health of the person who has to submit to the intrusion of his
body and could also lead to a contamination of the test results
that are to be admitted in court.
4

The technician who withdrew the blood from the Defendant
William A. Atwood, had no permit from the Department of health as
required by law.

Because he had no permit under Utah law, we

don't know if he meets the qualifications or standards set up in
Utah to stick a needle in someone's arm to draw blood.
Further, it should be noted that no one directed Mr. Woodall
or supervised Mr. Woodall.

There is a Utah case brought before

the Supreme Court in 1977 that addressed the issue of a person
drawing blood being directed by the proper person.

The court in

the State of Utah v. Durrant, 561 P.2d 1056 (Utah 1977)
reiterated that it was important not only that you have a duly
authorized laboratory technician but that person be immediately
directed and supervised by a physician, registered nurse or
practical nurse at the moment the technician withdraws the blood.
The court seems to put emphasis on the importance of having
competent certified medical people, following the health
procedures according to standard medical practice.

The court did

find that a licensed physician was attending the Defendant, and
because a doctor was attending the Defendant that was sufficient
to meet the statutory requirements to admit the blood at trial.
In the present case not only don't we have an authorized
laboratory technician we have no evidence of anyone supervising
the lab technician withdrawing the blood from Mr. Atwood.
The Supreme court has interpreted Utah law concerning the
admissability of blood tests when not drawn by a duly authorized
laboratory technician.

In Gibb v. Dorius, 533 P.2d 299 (Utah
5

1975) Justice Maughn wrote a decision on the very point issue
presented on appeal.

In the Gibb case the Honorable D. Frank

Wilkins at trial dismissed the charges against the Plaintiff and
restored his driving privileges.

The issue before the court was

whether or not the alcohol content in the blood test was
admissible.

.The blood was drawn by a person who was not a duly

authorized laboratory technician under Utah law.

Judge Wilkins

ruled there was no authorized technician to draw the blood and
therefore the results of the blood test were not admitted at
trial•

The principal question raised on appeal is did the state

provide a duly authorized laboratory technician to withdraw the
blood from Mr. Gibb.

The Supreme Court of Utah talked about the

danger of incursions into a person by anyone not duly authorized
in accordance with standard medical practice.

After reviewing

the concerns of people driving under the influence of alcohol vs.
the concerns of

intruding into a persons body Justice

held as follows:
This court on many occasions has
said it is its duty "to give effect
if such can be reasonably done, to
every word, clause and sentence of
a legislative enactment.11 It is
clear the legislature did not
intend to include any laboratory
technician, because of it's
specific limitation (duly
authorized), the association given
the term "duly authorized
laboratory technician" to it's
preceding companions, and the
contextual phrase "according to
standard medical practice." Gibb,
at 302.
The court then further stated:
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Maughn

We conclude that trial court
correctly found that the state did
not provide a "duly authorized
laboratory technician11 for the
purpose of withdrawing the blood
from Plaintiff; and that such
determination rendered moot the
question of Plaintifffs refusal to
consent to a blood alcohol test.
2d. Id.
Thus the Supreme Court of the state of Utah upheld a decision by
the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins.
Judge Wilkins as a trial judge in the Third District would
not let the evidence of alcohol in the blood into evidence.

The

reason he would not let it into evidence was because the person
who withdrew the blood was not a duly authorized laboratory
technician pursuant to Utah law.

The Supreme court upheld Judge

Wilkin's decision.
The situation we have today is almost exactly the same.
Atwood was subjected to a withdrawal of blood.

Mr.

The person who

withdrew the blood from Mr. Atwood was not certified under the
State of Utah.

No evidence was received at trial to show that

Mr. Woodall was a certified lab technician.

Because Mr. Atwood

was subjected to withdrawal of blood by a person not authorized
by Utah Law the test results from Mr. Atwood should not be
admitted at trial.

The trial court erred in denying the

Defendant's motion to suppress the test results.

Utah statutory

law, and case law make it very clear that the blood drawn from
Mr. Atwood should not have been offered into evidence.
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CONCLUSION
The Defendant Appellant respectfully requests the court to
reverse the lower courts decision.

The blood test results

showing the alcohol content are not admissible in court and the
decision of the jury should be overturned and the matter remitted
to the Circuit Court consistent with this opinion.

DATED this

day of

, 1992.

Steven C. Vanderlinden
Attorney for Defendant Appellant
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